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Why U.S. Grand Strategy has not Changed:  
Power, Habit and the Foreign Policy Establishment 
Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War?
 
If grand strategy is the 
orchestration of power and commitments over the long haul, in an integrated and consistent 
way, “to cause security” for oneself in a world where war is possible, the United States’ way 
of pursuing security is remarkably stable.
1
  Long before the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. 
formed a grand strategy of “primacy,” often coined as “leadership.”2 This strategy was only 
occasionally interrupted, and by the 1960’s it set the parameters for foreign policy debate.3 It 
has four interlocking parts: to be preponderant, or overwhelmingly militarily strong; to 
reassure and contain allies; to integrate other states into the “openness” of US-designed 
institutions and markets; and to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons.
4
 These fundamental 
                                                     
For their advice and feedback, the author thanks the anonymous reviewers, David Blagden, Francis Gavin, Ted 
Hopf, Hal Brands, Stephane Baele, Beverley Loke, Gregorio Bettiza, Jason Reifler, Ryan Grauer, Catarina 
Thomson, Robert Saunders, Tarak Barkawi, Sergio Catignani, Huw Bennett, Peter Feaver, Burak Kadercan, 
Jonathan Golub, Tim Vlandas, the editors at The National Interest, and participants at seminars at the 
International Studies Association and the University of Exeter.  
1
 I draw this phrase from Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.13. 
2
 For accounts of ‘primacy’, and the continuity in U.S. grand strategy since the Cold War, see Hal Brands, 
Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post Cold War Order (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2016), pp.332-333; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in 
American Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.114; Stephen Biddle and Peter 
D. Feaver, “Assessing Strategic Choices in the War on Terror,” in James Burk, ed., How 9/11 Changed our 
Ways of War (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp.27-56, pp.28-29; Paul D. Miller, American 
Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy (Washington, DC.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2016), pp.17, 266; Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy 
(Ithaca, N.U.: Cornell University Press: 2014), pp.5-12; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American 
Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp.105-117.  
3
 On the post-war evolution of U.S. strategy, see Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992), 
p.496; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World 
Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp.2, 169-193; Michael Lind, The American Way of 
Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life (New York, N.Y: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
pp.3-42, 125-150; Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: 
The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/2013), pp.7-51, pp.10-14; 
Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), p.140; John Lewis 
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).    
4
 On grand strategy within particular issue areas, see Michael Hogan, “Revival and Reform: America’s 
Twentieth Century Search for a New International Economic Order,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 
1984), pp.287-310; Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and 
Non-proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 4, No.1 (Summer 2015), pp.9-46, pp.19-38; Charles L. Glaser & 
Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Should the United States Stay in the Gulf?” in Glaser & Kelanic eds., Crude Strategy: 
2 
 
security commitments proved hard to change, even amidst shocks and changing conditions. 
Why?  
 
These are important questions. Scholars vigorously debate the sources of U.S. grand 
strategy. Some emphasise the structural-international drivers, claiming that the persistence of 
“primacy” is a response to the global distribution of power, and that the liberating effect of 
unipolarity, the large imbalance of material power in America’s favour, drives the 
superpower to predominate beyond its region.
5
 Others incorporate domestic factors and 
ideas.
6  
Much of this debate focuses on explaining change. In fact, U.S. grand strategy has 
shown more continuity than change. Despite the pressures of war-weariness and the Global 
Financial Crisis, primacy prevails. The absence of change is what needs explaining. This 
question has practical significance. In recent years, some analysts have recommended 
significant changes in U.S. grand strategy, calling for a shift to an alternative posture of 
“restraint” to retrench commitments, shift burdens and manage rather than resist 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Protect Persian Gulf Oil (Washington, DC.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2016), pp.233-251, p.233. 
5
 Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol.18, No. 2 (Fall 
1993), pp.53-67, p.77; Michael Mastanduno and Ethan Kapstein, ‘Realism and State Strategies after the Cold 
War’ in Unipolar Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp.138-181, p.147; William C. 
Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp.5-41, 
p.37; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (N.Y, New York: WW Norton, 2001, 2014 
edn.), pp.365-368; Benjamin Miller, “Explaining Changes in US Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 19 (2010), 
pp.26-65, pp.28-32. 
6
 Colin Dueck, “Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy, 2000–2004,” Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 30, No.4 (2004), pp.511-535, p.512; Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power 
Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp.7-8, p.15; Nuno P. 
Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.70-71; Peter 
Feaver, “Debating American Grand Strategy After Major War,” Orbis Vol.53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 547-552, p.548; 
Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” 
International Security Vol.22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp.86-124, p.88; Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: 
Partisan Ambition & American Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp.9-10; Randall 
L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), pp.46-69; Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Sein, eds., The Domestic Bases of 
Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.3-22; Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. 
Krebs, “Rhetoric, Legitimation and Grand Strategy,” Security Studies Vol. 24 (2015), pp.5-36, p.15; Brendan R. 
Green, “Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition,” International 
Security Vol.37, No.2 (Fall 2012), pp.9-43, pp.42-43. 
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multipolarity.
7
 
 
 Others warn against such shifts, urging policymakers not to abandon the 
country’s traditional leadership role.8 Attempts to shift U.S. grand strategy are unlikely to 
succeed, however, unless advocates of change understand why the current order persists, and 
unless they can identify the atypical conditions in which it might alter.
9
  
 
The best explanation for the stability of U.S. grand strategy is that an interaction of 
power and habit constrains first-order choices. By “power”, I mean a state’s relative 
economic size and military capabilities. By “habit”, I mean collective ideas that come to seem 
natural and obvious, axiomatic choices made from unexamined assumptions.
10
 I argue that 
the habitual ideas of Washington make U.S. grand strategy hard to change. These habits are 
perpetuated by a foreign policy establishment, working within the bureaucracy and as a 
wider, overlapping class of security elites. Known as the “blob”, a nickname popularised by 
                                                     
7
 Posen, Restraint, pp.69-131; Layne, The Peace of Illusions, pp.159-193; Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press & 
Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” 
International Security 21:4 (Spring 1997), pp.5-48; Joseph Parent & Paul K. MacDonald, “Graceful Decline? 
The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), 
pp.7-44, pp.43-44; Christopher A. Preble, Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less 
Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp.135-164; Richard K. 
Betts, “American Grand Strategy: Grand vs. Grandiose,” in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, eds., 
America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration (Washington, D.C.: Center for A New American 
Security, 2012), pp.31-42, p.32; Robert A. Pape, “Empire Falls,” National Interest, No. 99 (January/February 
2009), pp. 21–34; Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, “Restraining 
Order: For Strategic Modesty,” World Affairs, (Fall 2009), pp. 84-94; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. 
Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 95, No. 4 
(2016), pp.70-83. 
8
 Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America”; Robert J. Lieber, Retreat and Its 
Consequences: American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), pp.89-139; James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the 
Indian Ocean,” Asian Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2012), pp. 1-26, pp.21-22; Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, 
“Should America Retrench?” Foreign Affairs (2016), Vol. 95, No. 6, pp.164-172, pp.168-169. 
9
 The aim of this article is to explain U.S. grand strategy. Elsewhere, I argue that a grand strategy of restraint 
and power-sharing is a prudent alternative: Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S. Concert-Balance Strategy 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013).   
10
 Max Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), p.112; Ted Hopf, “The 
logic of habit in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations Vol.16, No.4 (June 
2010), pp.539-561, p.541. 
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former deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, this class of officials and 
commentators incessantly worries about the “collapse of the American security order.”11  
 
Where does the “blob” come from, and what does it do? The “blob” emerged out of 
America’s rising level of power during and after World War Two. There was a synergistic 
interaction between America’s precipitate rise, that generated demand for security expertise, 
and the activity of a group of American internationalists determined to tutor and steer the 
state, and ensure that the U.S. remained dominant and globally committed. These security 
elites formed into a cohesive, influential class. Over time, they internalised the assumptions 
of primacy, embedded those assumptions within government, and allegiance to those 
assumptions defined membership of the club. For the “blob”, the commitment to primacy 
became an article of faith, and self-evidently the only viable choice. As a grand strategy, 
primacy is worthy of debate, given that it demands significant up-front investments, 
implicates national security in developments far and wide, and makes the U.S. war-prone.
12
 
Yet the achievement of the “blob” was to erect primacy as the largely-undisputed and 
seemingly natural framework of U.S. diplomacy. 
 
Thanks to the influence of the “blob”, Washington is in the habit of primacy. There is 
little process of critical evaluation around the fundamentals. Alternative grand strategies 
hardly get a hearing. A pervasive ideology of “American leadership” constrains 
Washington’s choices. Successive presidents have been predisposed towards the grand 
strategic status quo. In particular, alternatives based on the retrenchment of commitments and 
acceptance of multipolarity are effectively taken off the table. In short, capability plus motive 
                                                     
11
 See David Samuels, “The Aspiring Novelist who Became Obama’s Foreign Policy Guru,” The New York 
Times Magazine May 5, 2016, p.27.   
12
 As Nuno Monteiro argues, “Unrest assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful,” International Security, Vol.36, 
No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp.9-40, pp.11, pp.19-20. 
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creates continuity. Washington’s international power position supplies the capability for 
America to pursue primacy, and its habitually formed ideology supplies the motive. For U.S. 
grand strategy to change, two developments would need to combine: rapidly changing 
external conditions, sufficiently shocking to disconfirm the assumptions of the status quo, 
and determined agents of change willing to incur domestic costs to drive it. Even as political 
polarisation intensifies, this development is unlikely. 
 
I test this explanation by examining two cases. The first is the presidency of William 
J. Clinton (1993-2001). Clinton’s America had great discretionary power to choose an 
alternative grand strategy, and strong incentives to consider change, yet Clinton preserved 
primacy in its essentials. The second case is the first year of President Donald J. Trump. 
Trump posed the strongest challenge in decades to the bipartisan consensus that America 
should lead the world. He threatened to shred alliances, abandon commitments and tolerate 
nuclear proliferation by other states. Even in this case, my theory accords with preliminary 
observations. From the first months of Trump’s presidency, the “blob” asserted itself.   
 
In both cases, policymakers acted in ways that my theory predicts. Despite fluid 
conditions that ought to have stimulated consideration of change, there was continuity. In 
each case, Washington reaffirmed and extended its existing strategy, despite the benign 
environment and pressure “to reap the benefits of the so-called peace dividend”13 in Clinton’s 
case, and despite constraints on resources and popular appetite for change in Trump’s. Grand 
strategy, involving the most consequential choices, emerged organically rather than through 
instrumental planning. Public “grand strategic” debate hardly penetrated decision-making 
within the executive. Decision-makers exhibited a reflexive bias towards legacy institutions. 
                                                     
13
 Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman & Jeffrey Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism and the State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.2. 
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Unspoken assumptions, suppression and self-censorship framed choices. There was some 
internal review, but it was ideologically circumscribed and more implementational than 
deliberative. In other words, it was concerned about how rather than whether to apply 
primacy.  
 
Existing explanations of U.S. grand strategy provide some explanation of continuity 
and change, but less well. “Structural” interpretations rightly highlight the importance of 
objective power realities that make it possible for the U.S. to pursue primacy in the first 
place. But the distribution of material capabilities is only a permissive condition, enabling the 
pursuit of primacy, not causing it. In earlier periods when the U.S. was ascendant, it often 
passed up opportunities to increase its power. Theories that treat grand strategic change as a 
response to changing circumstance, from threat levels to the distribution of capabilities, have 
trouble explaining continuities. In addition, a structural interpretation fails to explain why the 
U.S. selects some ways of maximising its power over others. Why did the U.S. choose to 
balance against rivals rather than buck-pass, to retain rather than wind down the NATO 
alliance, to fight instead of avoid peripheral wars? The type of power-maximisation that the 
U.S. pursues is consequential, and my theory better accounts for these choices.   
 
Existing domestic-level explanations also struggle to account for the making of U.S. 
grand strategy. Those who incorporate ideas and domestic factors into the explanation predict 
more change than has actually happened. Those that emphasise the content of ideas mostly 
treat grand strategy as a deliberative planning process of cost-benefit calculation, where the 
U.S. self-consciously selects primacy against competing alternatives in an open contest. As I 
will demonstrate, whereas U.S. grand strategy originated in an intensive debate after the rapid 
7 
 
shift in the balance of power in 1945, it is sustained differently. A rigorously self-conscious 
process of grand strategy selection is mostly absent from places of decision in Washington.  
 
Some observers note that unexamined assumptions reign in Washington, and lament 
the sterility of foreign policy debate, recognising that grand strategy is not made in formal, 
deliberative fashion.
14
  These critiques, though, leave under-theorised the question of how an 
organically-evolving grand strategy emerges from the interaction of policy agents and 
external conditions.  I argue that the power of habit can help explain this process by showing 
why some policy ideas do or do not receive a hearing in debates designed to chart a course in 
response to external circumstances.  I thus help connect domestic and systemic-level theories 
of grand strategy by showing how the policymaking process itself is shaped by prior events 
alongside individual and group beliefs. 
 
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I offer a deductive theory that explains 
the stability of U.S. grand strategy, and derive predictions about U.S. behaviour since the 
Cold War. In Part II, I demonstrate how that theory explains continuities in American 
diplomatic behaviour in the Clinton era. In Part III, I show that it explains the surprising 
continuities of Trump. In Part IV, I forecast that primacy will prove resilient.  
 
I Power and Habit in Washington 
What makes it hard to change U.S. grand strategy, even when conditions change? The force 
of habit, in combination with power, produces continuity. Habit is a type of path-dependency, 
the process whereby decisions are limited by prior developments in an historical path, 
                                                     
14
 Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan, “Why Washington Doesn’t Debate Grand Strategy,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly Vol. 10, No. 4 (2016), pp.14-45, pp.14-17; Christopher Fettweis, Pathologies of Power: Fear, 
Honour, Glory, and Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.227-
253; Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “Stress-Testing American Grand Strategy,” Survival, Vol.58, No.6 (2016), 
pp.93-120, p.93. 
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reproducing behaviour even in the absence of the conditions where it began.
15
 Habit-forming 
agents acquire the unconscious disposition to engage in previously adopted or acquired 
behaviour. The logic of habit is distinct from the logic of consequences, where actors 
consciously make instrumental cost-benefit calculations, and the logic of appropriateness, 
where agents choose with conscious reference to rules and norms.
16
 It is distinct from 
“bureaucratic politics” theory, where policy is the outcome of bargaining within government, 
with officials driven by organisational and personal interests.
17
  
 
To say that habit drives U.S. grand strategy is to suggest that policymakers become 
unreflective and non-deliberative about the framework within which decisions are taken. 
Prior beliefs about America’s place in the international order set the agenda and impose tight 
parameters within which bureaucratic politics play out. Habituated decision-makers are 
under-stimulated by changing conditions, incurious or dismissive about other options, and 
deliberate mostly within the boundaries of traditional rationales, codes of meaning, and 
analogies. The process is not automatic, but loads the dice in favour of received assumptions. 
Habit does not eliminate conscious thought, but channels thought so that it side-lines any 
deliberate, systematic revision. A “common sense” mediates between the environment and 
decision-makers, turning what were once calculated choices into axiomatic ones.
18
 Winston 
Churchill, for instance, invoked Britain’s “unconscious tradition” of supporting weaker states 
“to oppose the strongest, most aggressive” powers in continental Europe, to prevent a hostile 
                                                     
15
 See Zeki Sarigil, “Showing the path to path dependence,” European Political Science Review, Vol.7, No.2 
(2015), pp.221-242.  
16
 Vincent Pouliot, “The logic of practicality: a theory of practice of security communities,” International 
Organisation, Vol.62, No.2 (2008), pp.257-288, p.257. 
17
 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 
1971); Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1994). 
18
 Ernest R. May, “The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated versus the Axiomatic,” Daedelus, Vol.91, 
No.4 (1962), pp.653-667, pp.666-7. 
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imbalance.
19
 States inherit choices, not moving from a neutral zero but from legacies that 
prescribe what is legitimate and effective. Whereas most analysis focuses on what actors 
think about, attention to habit shows us where they think from.  
 
The process of habituation manifests itself positively and negatively. Negatively, it 
takes the form of self-censorship, by senior policymakers sidestepping or avoiding re-
evaluation of first-order questions. Scrutiny will be absent we should most expect it, within 
authoritative institutions charged to examine choices. Policy discussion will mostly be 
conducted through an operational mind-set, confined to issues of implementation. Positively, 
habit functions as a conformist pressure visibly applied to officials who question 
assumptions. When they step outside the ballpark, gatekeepers with privileged access, expert 
status and agenda-setting power will discipline discussion.     
 
Where does the habit of primacy come from? In the final years of World War Two, 
the United States rose to become the most powerful nation on earth.
20
 With other major 
powers exhausted by war, America experienced unprecedented industrial expansion. Its GDP 
doubled. It enjoyed the world’s highest per capita productivity. It dominated the world’s gold 
reserves, became the largest creditor and exporter, and the dollar was the reserve currency. It 
had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. Its long-range bombers, carrier task forces and bases 
gave it unrivalled reach. There was worldwide demand for its loans, arms, and patronage. 
America recognised, as any state would, its vastly increased power position. 
 
                                                     
19
 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 1 (London: Cassell and Co., 1948), p.162. 
20
 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1987), pp. 357-60. 
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This growth in relative power enabled the US to enlarge its ambitions to “visionary 
world-making”, pursuing security by reordering the international system.21 The rise of the 
state amidst the dangers of conflict generated demand for security experts. America at war 
became a “national security state,” organising intensively to project power through a 
fledgling bureaucracy of advice and planning. Global disorder of the 1930’s and 1940’s had 
already prompted an intellectual rediscovery of strategy, with security experts urging the US 
to realise its latent strength and flex its geopolitical muscles.
22
 Well-placed strategic minds 
then urged Washington to translate victory into hegemony, under a Washington-designed 
world order,
23
 assuming America should “succeed Britain as the military and economic 
guarantor and moral leader of the world.”24 This Washington did in concrete form, in the 
Unified Command Plan of 1946 that placed large parts of the globe under U.S. military 
commands, and in the 1947 National Security Act that created the National Security Council 
and the Central Intelligence Agency.   
 
Out of this process emerged a cohesive foreign policy elite. This elite successfully  
advanced major policies, from the post-war revival of Western Europe’s economies and the 
formation of NATO, to the creation of a National Economic Council, to the Bush II 
administration’s “surge” in Iraq. The establishment was demoralised by the Vietnam War and 
economic malaise in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, but rebuilt itself on the back of Ronald 
                                                     
21
 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy 
Formation,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2010), pp. 117-43, p.141. 
22
 See David Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression Era Origins of Security 
Studies,” International Security, Vol.36, No.3 (Winter 2011/12), pp.107-41. 
23
 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (New York, 
N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp.193-220; Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National 
Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 89, No.2 (1984), pp. 346-
81, pp.349-365; Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930’s (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), p.35.   
24
 Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson 1867-1950 (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1990), p.386.  
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Reagan’s presidency.25 It gets its way often. As research demonstrates, “the gravitational 
pull” on foreign policy decisions by the foreign policy establishment tends to be “stronger 
than the attraction of public opinion.”26 
 
The establishment is not monolithic. Its figures dispute issues below the grand 
strategic level, such as human rights, the extent of multilateral cooperation, democracy 
promotion or specific interventions. Until the 1960’s, it was mostly a patrician, 
predominantly white, Protestant class that internalised values nurtured “in prep schools, at 
college clubs, in the boardrooms of Wall Street, and at dinner parties.”27 It then incorporated 
non-whites, women, first-generation immigrants, Jews, and Roman Catholics, to form a more 
heterogenous class of coastal internationalists, oriented around the Ivy League. Still, this 
cross-section of internationalist elites - the forerunners of today’s “blob” – are united by a 
consensus. They are concerned that the U.S. remain engaged in upholding world order. They 
fear U.S. retreat from overseas responsibilities, warning abandonment would lead to the 
return of rival power blocs, economic stagnation and catastrophe. They have successfully 
established primacy as the only viable, legitimate grand strategy, and as an ingrained set of 
ideas, while installing themselves as insiders, positioned to steer the state.  
 
The “blob” reproduces its ideology through four causal mechanisms. First, security 
elites accumulate knowledge about what they think works and form mental shortcuts that 
they repeat and internalise. Secondly, they socialise personnel into their world view, 
educating and selecting individuals who conform, excluding or penalising those who don’t, 
                                                     
25
 Carl Gershman, “The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy Establishment,” Commentary, Vol.70, No.1 
(1980), pp.13-24; James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (London: Penguin, 
2004), p.110. 
26
 Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” American Political Science 
Review, Vol.99, No.1 (2005), pp.107-123, p.121. 
27
 Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York, N.Y.: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986), p.25. 
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linking conformity to an axiomatic world-view with insider status, and dominate the pool of 
experienced talent that makes up officialdom. They have privileged access to power via an 
institutional revolving door, a set of social networks and institutions, the locations where 
grand strategic ideas intervene at the unit level, between appointments in government, 
through to foundations, think tanks, universities and bodies from the Council on Foreign 
Relations to the Trilateral Commission.
28
 New presidencies will often retain career security 
officials for the sake of continuity. As the cohorts of qualified officialdom are socialised into 
orthodoxy, even presidents who wish to institute change will be drawn to select from that 
pool. The “blob” has close ties to corporate networks. Fifteen of Clinton’s key policy makers, 
according to one study, had a total of forty-one corporate affiliations, breeding an instinctive 
sympathy to the penetration of transnational capital,
29
 reflected in Clinton’s goal of “open and 
equal U.S. access to foreign markets.”30 Thirdly, they dominate public discourse and set its 
agenda, through privileged access to the commentariat, of which they form part. They have 
privileged access to media debate, supplying well-regarded expert commentary. Presidential 
candidates routinely approach establishment figures at think tanks to formulate their foreign 
policy manifestoes. They define the terms of debate, delegitimising alternative strategies as 
alien and foolish: retrenchment, limitation or war-avoidance they frequently brand as 
“retreat” or “isolationism.” Fourthly, they exert influence via a transnational pathway, 
supplying allies with a repertoire of ideas that those allies play back, creating a feedback 
loop.     
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 The “blob” itself is candid about how tight-knit, privileged and intimate with power it 
is. For Richard Haass, former Director of the Policy Planning Staff, think-tanks constitute an 
“informal shadow foreign affairs establishment”: 
 
Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell's predecessor as Secretary of State, once 
headed the Center for National Policy. Her former deputy, Strobe Talbott, is now 
president of the Brookings Institution -where I previously served as vice-
president and director of foreign policy studies…I've alternated stints at the 
National Security Council, the Defense and State Departments, and on Capitol 
Hill with time at Brookings, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the 
Council on Foreign Relations, and the Carnegie Endowment.
31
 
 
Self-identified members of the “blob” acknowledge the conformist pressures this policy 
environment creates. Leslie Gelb identifies a “disposition and incentives to support wars to 
retain political and professional credibility.”32 Derek Chollet observes an “ecosystem” that 
incentivises the support for activism and delegitimizes arguments for restraint.
33
 Michael 
Mandelbaum notes that the establishment defines the policy ballpark, setting boundaries for 
“what may be legitimately proposed and carried out.”34 Contrary to theories that the 
marketplace of ideas ensures rigorous weighing of choices, outsiders’ suggestions rarely 
penetrate decision-making.
35
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Explaining Change 
If habit often shapes grand strategy by inhibiting actors from revising it, how do grand 
strategies change? Alteration happens normally through an interaction of two variables:  
rapidly changing external conditions sufficiently shocking to disconfirm the assumptions of 
the status quo, and determined agents of change willing to incur domestic costs to drive it. A 
good example is Great Britain’s post-war abandonment of empire. External conditions had 
turned against the maintenance of colonies, through the cumulative fiscal pressures of World 
War Two, a growing decolonisation resistance, Washington’s dismantling of the economic 
order of imperial preference and the sterling bloc, and the shock of the Suez crisis of 1956 
that revealed Britain’s vulnerability to Washington’s coercion. Domestically, successive 
governments redefined Britain’s status around alliances and nuclear weapons, presenting 
retreat from empire as a graceful management of change, casting the emergence of 
independent countries as “the crowning achievement of British rule.”36  
  
Short of external circumstances quite so overwhelming, change remains possible but 
difficult. For the U.S., the major interruption was the Nixon-Kissinger interlude of 1969-
1974.
37
 Material developments strained Washington’s pursuit of primacy, through the 
Vietnam war, the OPEC oil embargo, inflation and an imbalance of payments, and racial 
conflict at home, cumulatively eroding America’s supremacy and the political will to pursue 
it. At the same time, Nixon was determined to shift Washington towards accepting stable 
multipolarity, particularly through his opening to Mao’s China and his treatment of the Soviet 
Union as a permanent partner in a post-hegemonic world order, downplaying and at times 
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abandoning nuclear counterproliferation as a priority, and pursuing hard-line Realpolitik.
38
 To 
achieve this, Nixon and Kissinger issued public explanations to legitimise their shift, and 
made policy secretly and obstructed oversight, by turns excluding, deflecting or dominating 
the national security bureaucracy, State Department and congress, to concentrate power 
among a small coterie of presidential advisers. This project attracted strong opposition. By 
the time of President Ford, this alternative order had unravelled.  
       
Grand strategic change is therefore rare. Hard-wired beliefs are resistant to change.
39
 
Major powers can retrench in order to adjust to adversity, but mostly within the limits of their 
fundamental design. Hence the long history of major powers falling prey to adjustment 
failure, overreaching or attracting hostile coalitions.
40
 People revise habits only when 
contradictory information is received dramatically and in large batches, and when determined 
agents realise they cannot assimilate those shocks into their world view, and pursue change. 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 is an example, where a shocking event discredits 
established orthodoxy. American primacy, and the confidence that America possesses vast 
latent power, is especially resilient to shocks. America’s relative strength is almost 
unparalleled in history, and enabled a story hard to falsify. It predisposes policymakers to 
interpret disasters - like the 9/11 attacks - as caused by an insufficiency of American 
dominance, and as evidence of the need for more. The “Bush Doctrine”, triggered by 9/11, 
unapologetically reasserted primacy and revived American traditions of preventive war.
41
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Washington kept its core commitments even in the wake of setbacks, such as the Global 
Financial Crisis or the Iraq War. 
 
I now offer predictions, derived from my deductive theory. There will be an essential 
continuity in US grand strategy in the decades after the Cold War. Its four parts – 
preponderance, reassurance, integration and inhibition -will persist despite shifts between 
presidencies, a changing balance in Congress, economic change and demands for reallocation 
of resources, a more benign threat environment, and a public increasingly averse to the costs 
of primacy. With the Soviet Union as the last major check on its power gone, Washington 
will look to realise its long-held goal of unrivalled dominance.  There will be no fundamental 
review of America’s grand strategy, despite incentives and opportunities for revision. Policy 
process within the executive branch, the branch that directs American statecraft, commands 
military forces and makes treaties, will be disciplined by gatekeepers, and public grand 
strategic debate will hardly penetrate. An operational mindset, or the “how” and “when”, will 
overshadow “whether.” Allies will encourage and reinforce the reigning ideology. This is 
precisely what we see. 
 
Part II: President Bill Clinton  
We now turn to the presidency of Bill Clinton.
42
 In this section, I demonstrate that Clinton 
persisted with primacy in its essentials, and that the interaction of power and habit is the best 
explanation. In the “unipolar moment” between the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks, 
the United States’ material dominance and the absence of external rivals gave it wide room 
for manoeuvre. The Soviet Union’s collapse attracted calls for a relaxation of commitments, 
to invest the spoils of victory at home. Clinton himself was oriented towards domestic 
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politics. A combination of structural and domestic forces should have induced Washington to 
revise its strategy, or to drift. These conditions make Clinton an unlikely case for my theory, 
posing a hard test of adverse conditions.
43
 Even though there was good reason to expect 
change, Clinton did not shift the U.S. from primacy. 
 
Primacy: What Clinton Inherited 
 
When Clinton took office in January 1993, he inherited the strategy of primacy. This 
strategy’s rationale is that America’s way of life, its republican and capitalist institutions, 
depends on a hospitable international environment.
44
 Without benign American stewardship 
overseas, militarised threats or hostile trading blocs would raise risks of evicting the U.S. 
from the major power centres of Western Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf, turning 
America into an encircled, unfree garrison state. America therefore actively prevents the 
world returning to competitive multi-polarity, and in particular, forestalls the emergence of a 
hostile imbalance of power in Eurasia. The strategy’s intellectual origins lie in President 
Woodrow Wilson’s rationale for American entry into World War One, and Secretary of State 
John Hay’s ‘Open Door Notes’ of 1899-1902.45 The strategy of primacy has four elements: 
preponderance, reassurance, integration and inhibition. Through preponderance America 
strives to be overwhelmingly strong, maintaining a preeminent military power position well 
beyond what it minimally needs to defend or deter threats, beyond its western hemisphere. 
Through reassurance, it acts as security provider and guarantor, to secure the commons to 
preserve stability, enable economic growth and contain its allies, dissuading them from 
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pursuing self-reliance and thereby becoming rivals. Through integration, Washington creates 
conditions optimal for the penetration of American capital, giving potential competitors an 
equity stake in its brand of market capitalism by investing them into friendly institutions and 
markets, associated with the remnants of the Bretton Woods framework and the Washington 
Consensus. Through nuclear inhibition, the U.S. prevents or slows the spread of nuclear 
weapons capability that would constrain its freedom of action.  
 
Primacy demands a high level of activity. It uses a global military presence to 
maintain a power position.
46
 It predisposes the U.S. towards frequent uses of force to 
maintain order. It also intends permanence. Anti-Soviet containment was the most pressing 
Cold War concern, but primacy was always oriented beyond it, to the international system as 
a whole, in a strategy that looked to an enduring Pax Americana. As the signature Cold War 
strategic document NSC 68 pronounced, “it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to 
check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less 
tolerable”, requiring “world leadership.”47 Because it seeks the permanent pacification of 
regions, the strategy of primacy and the U.S.’ forward-leaning presence endured after specific 
threats dissipated. America remained in Europe despite NATO’s ability to impose costs on 
Soviet expansionism by the early 1960’s, and in Asia after rapprochement ended competition 
with Mao’s China in 1972. Presidents typically claim a “new” approach to their predecessors, 
but strategies do not have to be named to be practised. Only rarely did presidents depart from 
primacy’s core assumptions.48  
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Continuity Under Clinton 
Clinton’s major choices conformed with “primacy.” At a juncture where Washington could 
have chosen alternative paths, the U.S. garrisoned Western Europe and Northeast Asia with 
approximately 200,000 troops, and held a forward military presence in the Gulf to ensure a 
favourable balance of power and oil stability.
49
 Formal alliances remained and expanded. 
America remained busy. It signed over 300 bilateral trade agreements. Clinton deployed force 
more frequently than most presidents since Truman, consistently for the stated purpose of 
upholding economic and political openness.
50
 In one fortnight in 1996, officials inserted 
troops into Bosnia, prepared for a possible Iraq attack against Kuwait, mediated between 
Greece and Turkey, and responded to China's intimidation of Taiwan.
51
 Clinton claimed to 
shift strategy from ‘containment’ to ‘enlargement,’ and to refocus on geo-economics and 
democracy promotion, with initiatives such as the North American Free Trade Agreement.
52
 
Objectively, these were second-order adjustments, consistent with the strategy of primacy, 
that did not disturb the four fundamentals. 
 
 At first glance, Clinton’s era ought to have been ripe for a review of primacy. 
Whereas his predecessor, President George H.W. Bush straddled the Cold War and post-Cold 
War eras, Clinton was the first president of the post-Cold War era. He presided during a 
benign period. There was domestic appetite for a “peace dividend.” Clinton appealed 
parochially to the mechanics of domestic policy: “It’s the Economy, Stupid”, was the catch-
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cry during the 1992 presidential campaign.
53
 There were alternative strategies on offer in 
public debate outside government. Proposals ranged from continuing primary, to “selective 
engagement,” to “offshore balancing” (a pullback to shift burdens and act as balancer of last 
resort), to “neo-isolationism,” to “normality,” focussing narrowly on the material balance of 
power.
54
 
 
Despite these conditions and the availability of alternative grand strategies, the 
Clinton presidency was notable for the absence of fundamental re-evaluation. Clinton arrived 
in office unprepared, without a worked-out coherent vision, as insider accounts agree.
55
 He 
dismissed grand strategy as “imposed after the fact by scholars, memoirists and the chattering 
classes,” and Secretary of State Warren Christopher advised against pursuing an overarching 
doctrine after Cold War “containment.”56 Clinton rarely attended meetings of the National 
Security Council. Officials lobbied him to spend time on diplomatic issues.
57 
There was no 
review of whether America should shift from primacy to a new strategy based on 
retrenchment and a new modus vivendi with other major states, and whether the U.S. should 
abandon preponderance, alliances, the Open Door or nuclear inhibition. Amidst interagency 
wrangling and the shocks of Somalia and Haiti that delayed Clinton’s first codified National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of June 1994, there was little internal debate over alternatives to 
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primacy. Retrenchment-based alternatives floated in public were known but quickly 
dismissed.
58
  
 
Clinton came to power in a slipstream. He inherited from the Bush administration a 
doctrine that the military’s purpose went beyond defense and deterrence, to ensuring 
preponderance, a globe-girdling strategy that demands outsized military power. As Bush 
directed in his 1989 review, the issue was how- not whether- to maintain existing strategy: “I 
do not expect this review to invent a new defense strategy for a new world. On the contrary, I 
believe our fundamental purposes are enduring and that…our Alliances, our military 
capabilities, remain sound.”59 Bush retained a strategy of primacy in which America should 
sustain military supremacy and global reach to outmatch any combination of rivals 
concurrently, to dissuade adversaries from competing, to contain allies, and to underpin 
economic openness. The Bush administration’s ‘Base Force’ structure was geared to support 
U.S. primacy, limiting reductions in order to maintain a forward presence, counter regional 
adversaries and reconstitute against emerging threats.
60
  
 
Under Clinton, the first general review of U.S. statecraft only took place in August 
1993 in response to criticisms of the White House’s reactive diplomacy, and was geared 
towards finding a unifying ‘bumper sticker’ concept, as National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake and speechwriter Robert Boorstin confirmed.
61
 The NSS was organised around the 
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headline speeches of Lake and Christopher in the autumn of 1993. Their organising concepts, 
Christopher’s “Engagement” and Lake’s “Democratic Enlargement” both took as an assumed 
premise all four component parts of traditional strategy. Christopher’s version assumed the 
US “must maintain its military strength”, “stem the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction’ and “knock down barriers to global trade.”62 Lake’s premise was that “America's 
power, authority, and example provide unparalleled opportunities to lead”, that its security 
rested on the rise of market democracy abroad.
63
 There is no evidence of a more fundamental 
revision process beyond consideration of how best to implement primacy. Clinton’s officials 
agree there was no systematic evaluation.  
 
Critics of the Clinton administration, such as historian John Lewis Gaddis, accused it 
of “autopilot.”64 A system on autopilot, though, carries a pre-programmed code. Precisely 
because Clinton was reluctant to re-evaluate, the status quo endured. Circumstances then 
forced consequential choices that exposed foundational assumptions. Two major choices had 
to be made: over the defense budget, which raised the issue of military preponderance; and 
NATO, which restaged the question of alliances. Each decision point carried first-order 
questions. Should America remain preponderant? Should it remain a European power? 
 
The size and disposition of defense budgets reflects grand strategy. How much is 
enough? What is the military for? In 1993, external change and the coming of relatively 
benign conditions might have prompted revision and retrenchment. With the Soviet Union 
gone, America was the most secure superpower in history, with a large nuclear arsenal, 
unmatched conventional forces, well-shielded ocean moats and the largest economy. Clinton 
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could have reallocated resources in line with alternative strategies being advocated in public, 
through reduced spending, shifting burdens or liquidating commitments in some combination. 
During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Clinton hinted at this possibility, promising 
to reduce defense spending and limiting America’s role to “tip the balance.”65 Clinton, like 
Bush, distanced himself from the starkly-worded “Defense Policy Guidance” document 
(DPG) of 1992, a document that was not released to the public but that generated 
controversy, as it envisaged America generating overwhelming military superiority to prevent 
the re-emergence of rivals.
66
 His first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, led a reformist 
‘Bottom Up Review’ (BUR).67 There were alternatives on offer in the public domain. The 
Centre of Defense Information, for instance, proposed a minimal force structure to reduce 
spending by over half, designed to defend and deter but not to support preponderance or 
supply extended deterrence.
68
  
 
Clinton oversaw some retrenchment, making initial cuts of 25%. The percentage share 
of GDP devoted to defense expenditure fell from 4.3% of GDP in 1993 to 3.1% by 1999.
69
 
Three factors, however, prevented these reductions from disturbing the foundations of 
primacy. Firstly, other states also reduced military spending. America remained relatively 
ahead, to the extent that the U.S. sustained a share of global military expenditure mostly 
above what it had been in the final years of the Cold War, varying above a baseline of 34% 
(see Figure 1). At the start of Clinton’s tenure, America’s share of world defense expenditure 
was 36.2%, exceeding the combined spending of other major industrialised powers Japan, 
                                                     
65
 “Clinton assails Bush over ‘Erratic’ Foreign Policy,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 1992.   
66
 Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” The New York Times, March 8, 
1992, p.14. 
67
 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom Up Review (October, 1993), at www.dtic.mil/get-tr-
doc/pdf?AD=ADA359953. 
68
 Barry R. Posen, “Defending America: CDI Options for Military Spending,” The Defense Monitor, Vol. 21, 
No. 4 (1992), p.4. 
69
 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), The Military 
Balance 2000-2001, Table 38, p.297. 
24 
 
France, the UK, Russia and Germany.
70
 By 2000 the end of his tenure, it was 34%, still 
exceeding the combined spending of all five.
71
 Spending levels stayed at approximately 80% 
of the average Cold War year. This was significant, since by 1997, the spending of Russia, its 
major potential peer competitor, had ‘slowed to a crawl’, falling to one-tenth of the USSR’s 
estimated military expenditure of 1988.
72
 Thirdly, America’s GDP grew from 6.6 to 9.8 
trillion dollars from 1993 to 2000, enabling it to sustain preponderant levels of spending even 
though it marked a smaller share of national wealth.
73
  
 
  
Source: Dinah Walker, Trends in US Military Spending (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 15 July 2014), p.2.  
 
Despite Aspin’s claim to novelty, that America was breaking away from containment,74 the 
Clinton administration’s commitments to restructure the military were diluted into a modified 
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version of the “Base Force” blueprint of the Bush I administration. The BUR left major 
questions untouched, such as burden shifting onto allies and the merits of major 
retrenchment.
75
 
 
Washington also maintained the traditional rationale for preponderance, working from 
the assumption that the U.S. should be insuperable and have global reach, beyond what it 
needed to defend and deter. Clinton maintained the “two war standard”, the assumption that a 
vital measure of American’s preponderance was its ability to prevail in two major, concurrent 
regional contingencies, and deter or counter two regional aggressors in distant theatres at the 
same time. The exact size of this standard has fluctuated, from “two and a half” standard 
under President John F. Kennedy, to “one and a half” during the 1970’s.76 But the principle 
persisted that for the U.S. to have enough capability to underpin its primacy, it must be 
capable of simultaneous conflicts. The Bush I administration had already confirmed this 
standard as a foundation of US leadership and “strategic depth”, to stabilise and deter, to 
show commitment and lend credibility to alliances.
77
  
 
The continued rationale for primacy can also be seen in the Department of Defense’ 
first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in May 1997.
78
 The Military Force 
Structure Review Act of 1996 directed it to incorporate existing assumptions about America’s 
forward-deployed defense posture.
79
 The QDR process did not reassess America’s alliances, 
its military force structure, its forward deployed prepositioning or its state of readiness, the 
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two-war standard or its underlying logic that the US should be able to intervene anywhere in 
the world at short notice. It attracted debate only about the balance between technology and 
mass and the types of adversaries that should be prioritised. A senior defense official 
rationalised why America’s Cold War posture continued: “we haven't changed much because 
much wasn't needed.”80 QDR recapitulated America’s role “as the security partner of choice”, 
and “leader of the international community,” based upon deterrence, reassurance, and 
traditional alliances. Abandoning it would tempt adversaries’ to pounce, causing “allies and 
friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures”, weakening America’s web of 
alliances and coalitions.
81
 Therefore under Clinton, the U.S. maintained the traditional logic 
of primacy, providing security to limit the need of others to secure themselves, to avert 
spirals of mutual alarm. 
 
 As well as deciding to remain militarily preponderant, the Clinton administration in 
1993 was confronted with a second issue of grand strategic magnitude.  Should America 
remain a European hegemon, the security provider in one of the world’s power centers? And 
what to do with NATO, its Atlantic alliance system?
82
 The Clinton administration enlarged 
NATO, in January 1994, announcing that it would include former Soviet satellite states 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This was a weighty choice. NATO enlargement 
marked the most significant expansion of trans-Atlantic security commitments in Europe for 
decades, extending eastwards America’s nuclear umbrella and the Article 5 guarantee to new 
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states that were once in the Soviet orbit. Clinton would go to war in the Balkans in the name 
of preserving NATO’s credibility.83 
 
NATO enlargement, on one level, represented a significant change. It was 
controversial with regards to the shape and extent of the alliance. But the change was justified 
as the continuation of previous wise policies. Above all, it was an alteration within the grand 
strategy of primacy, to adapt primacy to a post-containment era. Throughout, debate focussed 
on how, not whether, to remain a preponderant European power. 
 
The NATO issue divided the “blob.” Some opposed enlargement, urging Clinton to 
resist the appeals of aspiring members and keep America’s distance from Russia. Others 
favoured expansion, to ensure an imbalance of power in Washington’s favour. But they 
united around a simple assumption. They assumed that, given Europe was a potentially 
dangerous vacuum, America obviously should continue to maintain a geopolitical footprint 
there, to preserve a favourable continental balance that was an “essential” national security 
interest.
84
 Other possible choices were either hardly considered, such as the option to 
withdraw and liquidate the alliance, or were quickly dismissed, such as the creation of a new, 
pan-European security architecture. Even opponents of enlargement took the European 
commitment as a given.  
 
When Clinton came to office, the question of whether to remain a European power 
was already settled. Clinton inherited a general direction about America’s European 
commitments from the Bush I administration (1989-1993). In line with the traditional logic of 
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pursuing pre-eminence in Europe, President Bush responded to the collapse of Soviet power 
by retaining NATO, overseeing its absorption of a reunified Germany, and negotiating the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces.
85
 As Bush officials affirmed, NATO “must” be the vehicle for 
their role as a player within European security, and the US would remain a continental 
stabiliser.
86
 This would give Washington a free hand to decide on NATO enlargement, an 
issue that by October 1990 was under discussion.
87
  
 
How the “Blob” prevented Change 
In the Clinton era, the foreign policy establishment (and the assumptions it perpetuated) 
played a decisive role in ensuring that U.S. grand strategy did not change.  
 
Policy gatekeepers were a source of continuity. One establishment gatekeeper who 
straddled the Bush and Clinton administrations, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 
Powell, had strengthened the consensus behind preponderance. Powell drew authority from 
his intimacy with Washington, having served as Reagan’s National Security Advisor, his 
prestige from the victorious Gulf War, and the office of Chair that entitled him to advise the 
Secretary of Defense on his own initiative.  While Soviet communism collapsed, Powell 
agitated against the pursuit of a sizeable “peace dividend”, arguing that defense planning 
should be premised not on specific known or potential threats, but on the preservation of the 
U.S.’ capability to exercise international responsibilities.88 Powell’s “National Military 
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Strategy” of August 1991 interpreted the new security environment as the basis only for a 
revision of “means”, to ensure America’s capacity to pursue fixed “ends” in a new 
environment, to protect liberal order and the open economic system, to provide reassurance 
and stability in East Asia and the “new Europe.” Powell’s historical point of reference was 
traditional, the disastrous interwar period and isolationism.
89
 To operationalise these 
assumptions, Powell developed a “two-war strategy”, which in a period of reduced budgets 
presumed a hegemonic role with “world responsibilities” and a permanent, global military 
presence, with “the capability to move huge stores to unpredictable trouble spots around the 
world.” Powell’s lobbying ensured the Base Force was the “lineal ancestor” of Clinton’s 
force.
90
 Anthony Lake, another establishment gatekeeper with privileged access, steered 
Clinton to confine the “peace dividend” to levels that did not disturb preponderance, to 
oppose the use of defense budget as a “piggy bank for domestic programs,”91 and maintain a 
“strong defense posture” that would generate broad bipartisan appeal.92 Lake persuaded 
Clinton to frame the issue in binary terms, as a choice between internationalism versus 
isolationism.
93
 Clinton did so. He employed traditional analogies to define America’s world 
role.
94
 Like his predecessors, Clinton compared crises to Munich.
95
 He invoked Harry 
Truman’s embrace of internationalism and the lessons of two world wars, namely the wisdom 
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of engagement over isolation.
96
 The aftermath of World War Two was a lesson in choosing 
leadership “over the path that was followed after World War I.”97 
 
 As an indication of the strength of consensus, note how the few attempts to amend 
existing strategy failed. In the debate over defence budgets and military preponderance, 
Aspin proposed an alternative to the two war standard, a more frugal model of “Win-Hold-
Win”, waging all-out war in one theatre while holding the line in a second, then redeploying 
forces while allies held on.
98
 Establishment opponents such as former Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim, traditionalist commentators such as John T. Correll,  
unnamed service chiefs and senior military planners publicly portrayed the model as 
defeatist, as “win-hold-oops”, and damaging to credibility with allies.99 South Korea’s 
government objected to being the ‘hold’ amidst a military stalemate.100 Under these 
pressures, Aspin’s alternative “never stood a real chance bureaucratically or politically”101 
and the strategy Aspin floated in public in June 1993 he repudiated twenty six days later, 
falling back on the “Win-Win” model.102  
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One study of defense reportage in leading news organisations, where battles over 
strategy played out, also demonstrates how public media “locked in” elite orthodoxy.103 A 
survey of two hundred articles between 1994-1996 shows that mainstream media coverage in 
the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and to a lesser extent The New York Times 
reflected and reinforced the reigning ideology, and marginalised critics inside and outside 
government who called for a reassessment of Pentagon strategy. “Those who argued that the 
two-war scenario is unlikely, and that the threat of rogue states is overstated, and that 
Congress can significantly reduce the defense budget and still maintain US superiority, 
received little attention. Reporters and editorial writers did not question the Pentagon’s 
assumptions of what the United States needs to maintain its military edge.” In 1996, defense 
hawks and military officials were cited three times more than “cutters.”104 Throughout, there 
was little coverage of the wider context that defense budgets were still at least 80% of the 
Cold War norm of $270 billion; nearly four times larger than the next biggest spender Russia, 
and eighteen times the combined spending of the seven countries identified by the Pentagon 
as most likely adversaries.    
 
The strength of reigning orthodoxy was revealed in a rare moment of dissent, the 
“Tarnoff Affair.” On 25 May 1993, Undersecretary of State for policy Peter Tarnoff made 
off-the-record remarks about intervention in Bosnia.
105
 Tarnoff observed that financial 
constraints and domestic priorities dictated that there were limits on America’s “leverage” 
and capacity for intervention, that scarcity of resources created disinclination to use military 
force, requiring “genuine power-sharing,” “in a way that has never been the case before.” 
These remarks prompted disavowal from officials. Reacting to the Washington Post’s story, 
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journalists and critics accused Clinton of “Carterisation” and a retreat from world leadership, 
'inertia and drift.'
106
 Abroad, Britain’s BBC summarised it as an abdication of leadership and 
Japanese coverage suggested the disappearance of American’s nuclear umbrella, leading 
conservative politicians in Tokyo to advocate an indigenous nuclear arsenal.
107
 The White 
House scrambled to dissociate itself from Tarnoff’s remarks. Clinton’s press secretary 
insisted the official “clearly does not speak for the administration on the US role in the post 
Cold War world” and suggested his career was in jeopardy, and Christopher frenetically 
contacted journalists to insist that America would “take the lead in place after place.”108 
Christopher’s aides considered firing Tarnoff.109 In a speech three days later, Christopher 
referred to leadership twenty-three times, “to dispel any suggestion at home or abroad that the 
first Democratic Administration in a dozen years was sounding retreat.”110 The 
administration’s reaction is indicative of the strong disincentives even to hint at a major 
revision.   
 
As a further indicator of the strength of established assumptions, even organisations 
that were designed to test assumptions took primacy as their unexamined premise. Orthodoxy 
captured the government institution that could have revised first principles, the Office of Net 
Assessment (ONA) within the Pentagon. ONA focussed predominantly on the military 
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doctrinal-technical revolution, and the future threat of China,
111
 with America’s ‘pre-eminent 
position’ as its axiomatic starting-point.112 Likewise, in Congressional hearings into force 
structure levels, the focus quickly settled on how, not whether, to pursue preponderance. 
Discussion centred on America’s level of preparedness within a new threat environment, its 
capacity to intervene in the Gulf or the Korean peninsula to ensure ‘global stability and 
security’, and what constituted the appropriate “minimum” to achieve these goals.113   
 
We can also infer a habitual process from the inquiry of the later National Defense 
Panel (NDP), an independent group created in December 1996 by the Secretary of Defense to 
review the QDR. Even this official body, with its mandate to review America’s posture, 
uncritically affirmed the assumption of US preponderance. There was an activist bias in the 
NDP’s assigned task. It was asked to develop military responses to almost any threat to US 
interests. Its nine appointees consisted of defense “insiders”, (including two prominent “blob” 
members Richard Armitage and Andrew Krepinevich), former senior military officers and 
Pentagon civilian officials, four of whom were senior executives at defense contract firms.
114
 
Unsurprisingly, their report left orthodoxies untouched, suggesting incremental changes but 
not evaluating alternatives.
115
 It questioned the two war standard, but on the basis that it was 
not global enough, advising that the U.S. should prepare for ‘regular deployments to far-flung 
areas of the globe, from open deserts to confining urban terrain.’ Its final report presumed the 
existing account of U.S. security interests, emphasising the need to ensure “global stability” 
through existing alliances and “the expansion of free market arrangements into all regions of 
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the world.”116 The reception of the report was more conformist still. Its modest suggestions 
about reduced weapons purchases were largely ignored by Secretary Cohen is his response to 
Congress.
117
 Overall, the necessity of preponderance was the starting-point even for 
institutions tasked to review America’s plans. 
 
Clinton’s circle was anxious to build legitimacy by cultivating and impressing what it 
called the “foreign policy elite.” On the campaign trail, Clinton cultivated the advice of 
seasoned Democratic foreign policy hands, Madeleine Albright and Martin Indyk, Sam Nunn, 
Lee Hamilton, Dave McCurdy, and Stephen Solarz.
118
 Clinton consulted regularly with seven 
establishment advisors, including a corporate strategist, a former national security advisor, an 
investment banker, and a senior Washington lawyer.
119
 Officials were sensitive to elite 
reception of Clinton’s policies. Months after the Tarnoff affair, the president’s national 
security speech-writer, Robert Boorstin, reported meeting with foreign policy experts 
demanding to show “we are not simply managing crises, but organising the world.”120 
Commentators pressured the administration to disavow retrenchment strategies.
121
 With 
“blob” advice, Clinton’s second State of the Union address in January 1994 underscored the 
theme of American leadership through benign preponderance, framed against its binary 
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opposite of turning inward.
122
 In June 1994, the NSC’s deputy director of communications 
proposed a six month strategy to reengage think tanks, experts, foreign policy associations 
and former government officials.
123
 In September 1994 Boorstin briefed Lake of the “need to 
convince the media/foreign policy elite to take a fresh look at the President’s leadership and 
policies.”124 In early 1995, Boorstin proposed initiatives on non-proliferation and 
counterterrorism to strengthen the President’s “stature”, explaining “The elites 
care…Introducing new initiatives…will stimulate elites.”125 Clinton patronised the 
‘Renaissance Weekend’ of government and business magnates and his staff cultivated think 
tank experts and diplomatic veterans.
126
  
 
Regarding the U.S.’ transatlantic commitment, whereas NATO enlargement generated 
early disagreement – from within the State and Defense departments, and from former 
diplomat George Kennan and scholars such as John Lewis Gaddis - the question of whether 
NATO should persist at all hardly touched the policy process. NATO enlargement proceeded 
with remarkable speed and ease. Streams of dissent had little causal bearing on the decision-
making process. NATO enlargement attracted little discussion within the president’s circle. It 
was the subject of only one Principals Committee meeting, and attracted no official action 
memorandum.
127
 Clinton tilted towards favouring enlargement not through organised 
evaluation. Rather, he converted through an early galvanising experience on 21 April 1993. 
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He was moved by conversations with two European leaders, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, 
after the dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, when a holocaust survivor 
compared the bloodshed in the Balkans to 1930’s Europe.128 Both leaders with their moral 
authority lobbied Clinton in emotive appeals to support their states’ admission to NATO, 
with Havel “urging the American leader to move the Atlantic community of shared values 
and common defense eastward to include the new democracies of Central Europe…then-
President Lech Walesa of Poland delivered a similar message.”129 Clinton told Lake he was 
impressed with their vehemence, and supported enlargement from that moment.
130
 Clinton 
was open to these appeals, because it dovetailed with his pledges to expand market 
democracy and modernise alliances.  
 
The administration disregarded warnings that enlargement would commit the US to 
defend weak and vulnerable protectorates, and that enlargement might have the unintended 
consequence of stoking Russian insecurity and hostility through the perceived threat of 
humiliation or encirclement, a consideration Clinton blithely dismissed as “a silly 
argument.”131 Preserving and enlarging NATO in Europe fitted a preferred storyline about 
Clinton continuing American internationalism that was the basis for primacy. As an aide 
reported, “The idea that Reagan brought down the Berlin Wall, Bush unified Germany, and 
Clinton will unite Europe sounded good at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.”132 The alternative 
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storyline, of Clinton reconciling Russia with a new Europe, or bringing a victorious America 
home from liberated continent, was not up for discussion. 
 
The proponents of NATO enlargement achieved it with relative ease, because 
extending U.S. power into a vacuum fitted the logic of primacy. Clinton’s conversion to 
NATO enlargement was not a haphazard emotional impulse reflecting a lack of grand 
strategy.
133
 This major strategic move came spontaneously, without a considered internal 
debate, suggesting that long-term assumptions exerted themselves. The context of the 
occasion, a ceremony commemorating the Holocaust, is instructive. A central tenet primacy 
is the historical “lesson” that an ebb of American internationalism made possible 
totalitarianism and catastrophe, thus making it vital to continue America’s security domain in 
Europe. Clinton drew on this vocabulary to justify his decision and pitch it to international 
and domestic audiences.
134
 From this perspective, beyond anti-Soviet containment, NATO 
was an instrument of American hegemony, of consolidating democratic reform in Eastern 
European states and integrating them into a new security architecture. This “cognitive map” 
was shared by Madeleine Albright, a Czech-born refugee and Ambassador to the United 
Nations who announced the accession of new members.
135
 In the words of Clinton’s Review 
Directive of July 1993, “the consolidation of a market-oriented, democratic zone in the centre 
of Europe and the extension of Western values and institutions eastward are essential 
to…stability and prosperity.”136 The logic that enlarging NATO was a natural extension of 
American primacy also attracted bipartisan support even from anti-Clinton partisans. 
Representative Newt Gingrich, the leader of the conservative Republican Congressional 
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challenge, was persuaded in September 1993 by NSC member Jeremy Rosner that this was 
an opportunity for the “blue blob” of democracy to enlarge after the defeat of the totalitarian 
“red blob.” Gingrich assured Clinton’s speechwriter that “congressional Republicans could 
never oppose policies designed to enlarge the ‘blue blob’ of democracy now that the Soviet 
‘red blob’ had gone,” and Gingrich helped edit the draft of Lake’s landmark speech outlining 
the doctrine of ‘enlargement’, entering it into the Congressional Record.137 
 
Intensive internal process did not generate choices. The causality was the reverse. 
Only once Clinton made public statements, after prompting by his inner circle, did the 
bureaucracy produce concrete plans.
138
 The thrust of debate quickly settled on the question of 
whether to opt for a “fast track” or gradual process of enlargement. Ultimately, enlargement 
was a decision made by a small group of elites around the presidency, who then imposed it 
upon officials. The gatekeeper who oversaw the rapid decision to enlarge was Anthony Lake, 
and the gatekeeper who imposed it on reluctant officials outside the presidency was Richard 
Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs. Lake and Christopher 
deliberately forced Clinton’s hand by scheduling an “action enforcing event”, the NATO 
summit in Prague, January 1994. As Clinton proclaimed in Prague, the issue was “not 
whether but when and how.”139 This made the drive to expand irreversible. The settled 
unanimity between the president, vice president, national security advisor and secretary of 
state, and Clinton’s speeches, handed the enforcer Holbrooke a powerful weapon within the 
bureaucracy, as in September 1994 he waved the speeches at reluctant Pentagon officials to 
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warn them against insubordination.
140
 There remained debate about the process, sequence and 
criteria for membership, and Russian cooperation. Talbott, Clinton’s Russia advisor, urged 
caution about the details of the implementation, while sharing the underlying goal to integrate 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union into the Euro-Atlantic Community.
141
 The speed 
and informality with which the president committed the US, the domination of operational 
questions of how and when, the relative ease of persuasion suggests the force of habit was 
strong. 
 
The same logic underpinned lobbying efforts. Proponents framed NATO enlargement 
as a natural extension of American primacy, a seed that fell on fertile ground, given the 
widespread, emotive identification of American leadership with eastern European democracy. 
This argument met a strong reception among foreign policy power figures such as NSC 
Senior Director and Special Advisor to the President Daniel Fried. At a dinner in February 
1997 for “a select group of Washington’s power elite,” Polish dissident Adam Michnik 
“mesmerised his audience with a two-hour discourse on Poland’s tragic history, his own 
incarceration and torture by the communist police, and how NATO membership was the 
logical culmination of Solidarity’s struggle for democracy and freedom. The audience was 
overwhelmed.”142  
 
In persuading reluctant lawmakers to support enlargement, lobbyists from the US 
Committee to Expand NATO (USCEN), a committee formed of major figures from the 
“blob”,143 successfully drew on embedded assumptions to frame NATO enlargement as 
naturally American. As the participant Ronald Asmus recalls their rationale, “If NATO did 
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not exist, would we create it and what would it look like? Our answer was that of course we 
would still want to have a strategic alliance between the US and Europe to defend our 
common interests against future threats. But it was also obvious that such an alliance would 
look quite different – and would have new members and be focused on a different set of 
missions. Ergo, enlargement was part of the natural transformation and modernisation of 
NATO for a new era…the changes we were making in NATO were a commonsensical 
adaptation of the Alliance to a post-Cold War world.”144 “Commonsensical”, “natural”, 
“obvious”, “of course” – this is the vocabulary of habit. Subsequent congressional debate 
reflected the ease with which these habitual ideas took hold. The high-stakes commitment, 
already endorsed in both major party platforms, received only a brief debate and “no more 
than a cursory glance”145 before the Senate and House overwhelmingly passed the NATO 
Enlargement Facilitation Act in July 1996.   
 
Even arguments made against enlarging NATO were predominantly conservative 
ones, reflecting the assumption that the US self-evidently should maintain its European 
commitment. Much criticism was driven by anxiety that enlargement could jeopardise 
America’s European commitment, rather than alternative rationales, that NATO was 
unnecessary or obsolete in a post-Soviet world. Early opposition from the Defense 
Department and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe argued expansion could dilute 
NATO’s effectiveness. An open letter in June 1997 signed by 46 experts, retired diplomats, 
senators, senior military officers argued that enlargement would ‘degrade NATO’s ability to 
carry out its primary mission’, and domestically “will call into question the US commitment 
to the Alliance, traditionally and rightly regarded as a centrepiece of US foreign policy.”146 In 
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a Council on Foreign Relations debate in December 1996, where academic and former 
security advisor Michael Mandelbaum defeated Richard Holbrooke in a straw poll, 
Mandelbaum claimed enlargement would shake the consensus in favour of “an essential 
American commitment.”147   
 
To anticipate an objection, some might argue that in consolidating pre-eminence in 
post Cold War Europe, Clinton’s America was merely exploiting its power advantage and 
opportunity to expand. Material structure, however, is not a sufficient explanation. At 
previous crossroads moments of power advantage, the US relinquished opportunities to 
expand.
148
 It did not conquer Mexico or Canada after 1850, despite its continental hegemony 
after the withdrawal of European powers. In the economic boom of 1865-1889, the U.S. 
enjoyed high relative strength, yet hardly expanded or developed military forces. In 1918-
1920, with European powers depleted by war and America’s relative economic and military 
strength enlarged, the U.S. rejected alliances with Britain or France, refused any 
combinations within the League of Nations, and withdrew to its western hemisphere.
149
 Even 
after World War Two, that devastated other great powers, the U.S. had not yet formed a  
commitment to primacy. Truman’s Washington lacked a settled consensus, and was receptive 
to competing proposals to contain or accommodate the Soviet Union.
150
 Washington only 
strove to increase its extra-regional pre-eminence after the Korean War, a contingent event, 
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shifted opinion.
151
 By contrast, the US by 1991 had been a superpower for decades, a 
cohesive foreign policy establishment had arisen, and the habit of primacy had formed. 
 
Neither can Clinton’s continuation of U.S. grand strategy be explained away as a 
populist measure. There was little domestic popular demand for a reassertion of primacy. 
When the populace articulated preferences, most expressed attitudes consistent with more 
restrained strategies that accepted multi-polarity and a scaled-back American role.
152
 There 
was a chronic gap between elite and popular opinion regarding the scale of America’s 
international undertakings. Elites showed a preference for military activism and unique 
responsibility for security provision.
153
 When Republicans tried to turn Clinton’s global 
leadership into an electoral issue in 1996, the electorate was unresponsive, weighing 
economic and social issues well above foreign and defense policy.
154
 As well as superior 
access and resources, the elite cared more.
155
 Public disengagement left the way open for elite 
opinion to impose the boundaries for strategic choices, and their preferences carried the day. 
 
Part III: President Donald Trump 
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A second case is the first year of President Donald Trump, who was inaugurated on 20 
January 2017. Trump posed a greater challenge to the established security order than any 
incoming president since Nixon. He posed a revealing test case of the resilience of primacy. 
As an outsider, he was elected on a wave of revolt against the established tenets of U.S. grand 
strategy and those who upheld it. Trump rejected the bipartisan cause of American 
leadership, instead taking up the slogan of interwar isolationism and zero-sum nationalism, 
“America First.” The critical test is how Trump behaved in office, and whether an 
iconoclastic presidency ended up conforming with core tenets of primacy. Preliminary 
observation suggest that his behaviour accords with my theory’s forecasts on most grand 
strategic questions. Trump is emphatically not a ‘normal’ president. But for this ‘change’ 
candidate, the constraints of tradition tamed him into conformity. 
 
Trump as a property tycoon and celebrity ran for office as an insurgent against the 
establishment. He was an “outsider”, the first President without elective office experience 
since Eisenhower. He based his campaign on hostility both to the status quo and the policy 
elite that guarded it. Officials and lobbyists he characterised as a failed, corrupt oligarchy, 
vowing to “drain the swamp” and to “look for new people.”156 Trump provoked the 
opposition of former senior security officials, defense intellectuals, and ex-presidents, and 
both sides not only attacked his probity, sanity and legitimacy, but presented the November 
2016 election as a contest over the very fundamentals of America’s role in the world.157 
Trump threatened to shred traditional alliances, accommodate major adversaries, tolerate 
nuclear proliferation, abandon the frequent use of military force, and exchange free trade for 
protectionism.   
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As Trump took aim at all four of the core tenets of U.S. grand strategy, some 
predicted he would run an experiment in applying retrenchment-based strategies long 
advocated by academic realists, bring primacy to an end,
158
 and convert the Pax Americana 
into a “transactional protection racket.”159 Traditionalists feared that Trump both marked and 
stirred a popular tide against the burdens of U.S. primacy, thus destroying the domestic basis 
for U.S. primacy. Voters may not have elected Trump primarily because of his stances on 
alliances or nuclear proliferation. They did, however, respond to his assaults on free trade, 
failed wars and his attacks on globalisation. Registered Trump voters ranked foreign policy 
high on their priorities, suggesting Trump’s broader message resonated, of putting America 
first, ending others countries’ free-riding at its expense, and that a self-serving establishment 
failed to secure US interests abroad.
160
  
 
Yet when we consider Trump’s record in his first year across central grand strategic 
issues, on alliances, nuclear counter-proliferation and military preponderance, there was more 
continuity than change. Within months, Trump had ‘abandoned stances that were at the 
bedrock of his establishment-bashing campaign.’161 The first fruits of Trump’s national 
security team’s adjustments pleasantly surprised traditionalists, as reassuringly 
‘mainstream.’162 Realists who hoped for fundamental change were disappointed that Trump’s 
                                                     
158
 Rosa Brooks, “Donald Trump has a Coherent, Realist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, April 12, 2016; Kori 
Schake, “Will Washington Abandon the Order? The False Logic of Retreat,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 96, No.1 
(2017), pp.41-46; Stewart M. Patrick “Trump and World Order: The Return of Self-Help,” Foreign Affairs 
Vol.96, No.2 (2017), pp.52-57. 
159
 Steve Coll, “Global Trump,” The New Yorker, April 11, 2016. 
160
 Pew Research Centre, 2016 Campaign: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction (July 7, 2016), p.32. 
161
 Stephen Collinson, ‘Trump’s stunning u-turns on NATO, China, Russia and Syria’ CNN 13 April 2017. 
162
 Michael O’Hanlon and David Gordon, “Surprise! Trump’s Foreign Policy is turning out OK,” USA Today,  
February 23, 2017; James Jay Carafano, “The Most Shocking Thing about Trump So Far: How Boring He’s 
Been,” The National Interest, March 13, 2017; Elliott Abrams, “Trump the Traditionalist: A Surprisingly 
Standard Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 96, No. 4 (2017), pp.10-16.  
45 
 
statecraft resembles his predecessors’.163  It is not change but the sources of stability that need 
explaining. Only in the realm of economics may Trump be an insurgent, and this is not yet 
clear. Otherwise, the power of the “blob” and tradition constrained Trump’s administration, 
making his stance towards U.S. global commitments more orthodox than was expected, in 
substance if not in style. 
 
Trump’s Continuity 
Before becoming president, Trump threatened to shred traditional alliances. He branded 
NATO outmoded, expensive, irrelevant to contemporary security problems and “obsolete.”164 
At other times, he threatened to change the basis of alliances, making what had been 
permanent U.S. commitments more conditional and transactional, issuing threats to allies in 
Europe and Asia that the U.S. might abandon them if they did not pay up.
165
 Trump implied 
similar policies for the Gulf. About Saudi Arabia, the traditional bulwark of U.S. power-
projection in the Gulf, Trump as candidate argued it should pay more for America’s 
‘tremendous service’, and accused it of complicity in the 9/11 attacks.166 Trump suggested 
also that he would accommodate America’s rivals, especially Russia. He promised to give 
Russia, NATO’s resurgent adversary, a freer geopolitical hand. He would shift burdens by 
forcing allies to pay for protection. While it is unclear whether Trump issued threats of 
abandonment genuinely in order to coerce allies into increasing their contributions. 
Regardless, such open threats struck against the grand strategy of primacy, which regards 
permanent commitments as essential even if the distribution of sacrifices is lopsided. 
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Within only months of Trump’s presidency, he significantly altered both the rhetoric 
and substance of his stance towards allies. By April 2017, NATO was ‘no longer obsolete.’167 
In May, Trump increased the existing European Reassurance Initiative by 40%, established to 
reassure allies with increased troops, infrastructure and exercises after Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea in 2014.
168
 Trump signalled support for NATO while insisting its members contribute 
more, most notably in his address at the alliance headquarters in Brussels in May 2017 and in 
Warsaw in July.
169
 By June, he reaffirmed the commitment to Article Five of the NATO 
Charter.
170
 Having once dismissed the alliance, Trump at the urging of advisors now took 
only a more abrasive version of the position taken by every president since Eisenhower, that 
NATO is vital, but that member states should contribute more. In the Middle East, Trump 
embraced Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies in America’s traditional role as armorer and 
protector, in his May visit to Riyadh signing a $110 billion arms deal and jettisoning 
“America First” rhetoric in favour of “bipartisan internationalism.”171 Within six months, 
Trump’s strategic vision for the world’s key power centers – the Gulf, Europe and East Asia- 
held America to be the principal security provider. In Asia, Trump’s Secretary of Defence 
reassured Japan and South Korea of U.S. commitment, affirming to Japanese premier Abe 
“that he would uphold America's alliances and military agreements in the region.”172 Towards 
Russia, Trump did not lift sanctions against Russia over the Minsk agreement, demanding 
that Russia withdraw from the Crimea. In other diplomatic areas, Trump showed general 
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continuity with his predecessors, opposing Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and 
reaffirming the “One China” policy.173 
 
Trump has also rededicated the U.S. to military preponderance and the frequent use of 
force that is a hallmark of U.S. unipolarity. Campaigning for office, Trump denounced his 
opponent’s hawkishness. He promised to reduce and focus the use of force, to “stop racing to 
topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we shouldn’t be involved with,” to 
withdraw from Afghanistan,
174
 to avoid nation-building expeditions, and to focus on ISIS and 
counter-terrorism.
175
  
 
Since taking office, Trump showed a propensity towards using and expanding the use 
of force. He had a higher frequency of bombing than President Obama. By 31 July 2017, 
Trump had overseen the unleashing of 80% of the bombs dropped by the U.S. under Obama 
during the whole of 2016, including the most bombs dropped on Afghanistan since 2012, 
including largest non-nuclear bomb ever dropped in combat.
176
 Trump also increased the U.S. 
ground commitment to Afghanistan, added with intensive diplomacy in Central Asia.
177
 In 
the name of deterring the use of chemical weapons, Trump bombed Bashar Al Assad’s 
regime in Syria. Trump also bolstered the U.S.’ military deployments to NATO’s eastern 
flank. Trump declared an increased defense budget and an ambition for nuclear supremacy. 
His combination of arms build-up and budget expansion amounted to ‘warmed-over 
Reaganism’, and like Reagan Trump drew on the budget blueprint of the Heritage 
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Foundation, not exactly a bastion of isolationism.
178
 Trump also conformed with the tradition 
of ‘inhibition’, forcefully confronting North Korea over its nuclear and missile programmes. 
While campaigning, he suggested he would tolerate nuclear proliferation by South Korea, 
Japan and Saudi Arabia. He imagined negotiating with the ‘rogue’ proliferator, North Korea’s 
ruler Kim Jong Un. And he suggested that nuclear proliferation was both inevitable and 
acceptable.
179
 
 
These sentiments violated decades of tradition, whereby the U.S. has actively 
inhibited proliferation through security guarantees, troop deployments, arms sales, nuclear 
umbrellas and sanctions threats.
 
By the summer of 2017, Trump was engaged in 
brinksmanship with Pyongyang, attempting to coerce the ‘rogue state’ to abandon its nuclear 
ambitions. Trump’s America exercises military preponderance, maintains alliances and 
pursues counterproliferation, even at the risk of war, in order to forestall the emergence of 
challengers and prevent a return to multipolar disorder. 
 
Explaining Continuity: Trump and the “blob” 
The pattern of Trump’s conformity on major grand-strategic questions fits my theory’s 
predictions. Trump took office at a time when the electorate was buffeted by war weariness 
and the long-term stresses of the Global Financial Crisis. These pressures could have been a 
basis for grand strategic revision. Yet for all his campaign rhetoric and appeals to popular 
discontent, Trump is not trying to overhaul grand strategy. He has been unwilling to bear the 
domestic costs and spending of political capital that such a revision would entail. In the 
absence of a determined agent of change, the advantages of the “blob” persist. The “blob” has 
a privileged position in presidential staffing and security expertise, it exerts ‘discourse 
dominance’, and it is reinforced by the demands of allies.   
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Trump’s volte-face is not the random shifting of a maverick. Rather, the “blob” 
constrained him by both isolating him and dominating policymaking. With Trump elected, 
the “blob” urged capable bureaucrats to boycott the administration. At the same time, they 
lobbied the president to uphold tradition.
180
 Trump suffered a staffing dilemma. To appoint 
experienced officials to key positions would install defenders of the status quo. Yet to 
appoint untutored outsiders would raise risks of error, and to mix both groups would threaten 
coherence.
181
 In forming his transition team, Trump leant heavily on ‘DC insiders’ that he 
had denounced, including former administration officials and corporate lobbyists. Trump 
reached into the ‘big pool’ of his party for the ‘most highly qualified’ candidates.182 His 
senior appointees were mostly ‘primacists’ who had the “blob”s’ blessing. These included 
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, a retired Marine General and former Hoover Institution 
Fellow, believer in primacy, and who with Vice President Pence assured NATO of America’s 
continued support.
183
 Trump appointed CIA chief Mike Pompeo, with hawkish stances 
against nuclear proliferation and Russian adventurism, and support for arms sales to Israel 
and Taiwan.
184
 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, a former oil tycoon endorsed by Robert 
Gates, vowed to assert American primacy against China’s expansion and to oppose nuclear 
proliferation.
185
 Trump appointed as National Security Advisor General H.R. McMaster, a 
protégé of the orthodox General David Petraeus, who believes in the indispensability of 
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America’s security provision, and that retrenchment will create dangerous vacuums.186 He 
appointed former senator, lobbyist and diplomat Dan Coats as Director of National 
Intelligence. Trump appointed Putin critics to every major national security post, significant 
given that Russia is the focal point of criticisms that his diplomacy is compromised.
187
 These 
included former presidential candidate, governor and ambassador Jon Huntsman as 
Ambassador to Russia, and Fiona Hill, a Brookings Kremlin analyst sceptical of the 
possibility of a Russia-US accommodation, as White House senior director for Europe and 
Russia.
188
  
  
Trump’s staffing problems underscore a difficulty in making grand strategic change. 
Hiring well-qualified implementers of such an overhaul is difficult, given the tradition in 
which most policymakers grow. Partly because of the mobilisation against the new president, 
the administration remained significantly understaffed. The failure to appoint many 
subcabinet posts  meant that many senior advisors are career civil servants of what Trump 
denounced as the “permanent government.” Valuable expertise also explains the retention of 
holdovers from the Obama administration, such as diplomat Brett McGurk due to his “almost 
impossible-to-replicate, case-specific knowledge.”189 Trump appointed some inexperienced 
“outsiders,” his son-in-law Jared Kushner, the National Security Advisor Mike Flynn, and the 
‘anti-globalist’ strategist Steve Bannon. But in the White House, a power centre emerged of 
traditionalist military figures with a commitment to primacy, who exerted restraining 
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influence.
190
 Significantly, Trump stripped Bannon of his role on the National Security 
Council, restored the traditional roles of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Director of National Intelligence, and Flynn was forced to resign.
191
  
 
With the “anti-globalists” side-lined, an intensive and coordinated briefing on 20 July 
2017 by the traditionalists Pence, Mattis and Tillerson influenced Trump, “explaining the 
critical importance of forward worldwide deployments” and dangers of retrenchment, 
tailoring the “Open Door” logic to Trump’s background, the value of “military, intelligence 
officers and diplomats” in “making the world safe for American businesses.”192 In his inner 
convictions, Trump does not have to convert to primacy for primacy to persist. On major 
questions, he felt its constraints, even when watching television as he frequently did. As 
Daniel Drezner suggested, ‘the more mainstream foreign policy advisers are better at being 
on television.’193 
 
The “blob” enjoys a number of advantages. As well as influence within Trump’s 
bureaucracy, it retains ‘discourse dominance.’ It can attack the legitimacy of measures that 
offend tradition. It can act through the courts and the quiet resistance of civil servants, and 
can articulate alternatives through well-funded think-tanks.
194
 It has strong institutional 
platforms in Congress, links to a powerful business community, and a network of NGOs.
 
The 
new president with his inchoate world view was not a determined revisionist who could 
overcome these obstacles, and quickly fell into line.   
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Conclusion 
 
What explains the continuity of U.S. grand strategy? I have argued that a combination of 
power and habit makes U.S. grand strategy stable and hard to change, even in adverse 
conditions. Change is possible, but only in conditions shocking enough to undermine 
assumptions, and even then, only when a president arrives who is determined to overhaul 
primacy and absorb the pain of doing so.  This I have demonstrated through two cases, 
presidents Clinton and Trump. In both cases, ‘change’ candidates  came to office promising 
to revise the status quo, only for habitual assumptions and the foreign policy establishment 
(the “blob”) to tame them back towards maintaining primacy. In identifying the “blob” and 
its influence as a driving force in Washington, former presidential advisor Ben Rhodes was 
right.  
  
Washington’s capabilities give it the capacity to select a grand strategy of ‘primacy.’ 
But this does not tell us why it has maintained that choice, even in conditions that create 
opportunities for revision and incentives for change. Theories that stress the importance of 
ideas and the domestic are an important answer to the puzzle. But how ideas are transmitted 
is just as important as the content of those ideas. This is where the process of habit and the 
foreign policy establishment – the “blob” - intervene. Decades of being a superpower left 
Washington averse to revising fundamental assumptions, narrowed the spectrum of possible 
choices and discouraged consideration of alternatives. The “blob” with its cohesive network 
of officials, security experts and commentators exerts a powerful constraining influence in 
narrowing discussion within decision-making circles. Its members believe that the 
assumptions underpinning ‘primacy’ are self-evidently true and that grand strategies based on 
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retrenchment are self-evidently imprudent and unworthy of serious consideration. By direct 
and indirect means, the “blob” ensures that in Washington, there is never a ‘fair fight’ 
between primacy and restraint. As a result, the starting-point for most discussion of grand 
strategic questions is managerial: how to implement primacy, not whether to. Non-trivial 
disagreements over interventions, sanctions or treaties may seem to reflect fundamental 
divisions, yet they mostly reflect tactical disagreements about the execution of existing 
strategy.  
  
Habit-driven style impoverishes decision-making. It insulates assumptions from 
scrutiny. It makes it difficult to anticipate and respond to change, and to evaluate success. 
Defenders of primacy will resist the suggestion that entrenched assumptions drive U.S. grand 
strategy, arguing that primacy endures because it is self-evidently the ‘best.’ Even if it is the 
best strategy, the stakes are high enough to warrant more systematic review. Primacy entails 
trillions of dollars of investment. It makes the U.S. prone to frequent uses of force. It poses 
challenges to the American constitution, by increasing the power of the state.  And it 
implicates the country in potential conflicts worldwide. This is worth a proper review. Yet if 
my theory is correct, current arrangements will endure without a review until the rare 
conditions for change arrive.  
 
For supporters of primacy, from American traditionalists to allies anxious about U.S. 
commitments, my theory offers the good news that continuity is likely. For critics, my theory 
should be sobering. For a grand strategy of restraint to supplant one of primacy, it would 
require a fundamental change to the way Washington conducts foreign policy deliberation. 
Otherwise, advocates of restraint will have to await conditions distressing enough to place the 
foundations of current strategy in question, and the arrival in the White House of a change 
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agent willing to go to the trouble of overhauling it.  Until that hour, primacy in its 
fundamentals is unlikely to change. Washington’s decades-old design will endure without a 
proper audit, as the master, not the servant, of American democracy.    
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
